Government Surveillance in the Digital Age Essay - 2365 Words

Government Surveillance in the Digital Age Imagine walking along a busy street in the middle of a sunny day. Also imagine that someone is following you around, videotaping everything you do. Disturbing thought? Even more disturbing is the fact that the United States government is already doing this, and its perfectly legal. According to Robert Trigaux, a reporter for the St. Petersburg times, until August of 2014, in Ybor City, Florida, the Tampa Police Department used fourty-six surveillance cameras that scanned faces of all people walking around the entertainment district. These surveillance cameras captured facial images and then compared them to a police database of known felons. This same surveillance system was also†¦show more content†¦As technology allows for faster forms of communication, the Untied States government is quick to ensure that it can monitor the most popular forms of communication. Telephone calls and Internet communications are the standard medium of expression today, and the methods that may be used to monitor communication through these mediums are very developed. The telephone is a relatively simple technology, so monitoring someones telephone calls is a rather simple task. Mostly, only very large service providers maintain large networks, and so in order to monitor s omeone, the government can easily determine the specifics by contacting only a few companies. However, Internet communication is far more technologically advanced, and it is much more difficult to monitor peoples Internet communications than it is to monitor their telephone conversations. As the Internet is a relatively new creation, there is little centralization, and even finding someone online can be difficult enough. Still, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has software, nicknamed Carnivore, that it can use to monitor all of the Internet activity of a suspected felon, and the suspected felons Internet Service Provider is required to provide the FBI with a physical location through whichShow MoreRelatedSurveillance : The Act Of Surveillance1526 Words   |  7 Pages The act of Surveillance refers to continuous monitoring of activities of a particular area or a person. Mass Surveillance refers to monitoring activities of a sample population or target group. The video monitori ng at malls or stores and the installed CCTV at traffic signals is also an act of mass surveillance. However, such surveillance has become important part of business operation or road safety management due to video recorded proof in case of any crime. We stand at an age where nothing isRead MoreThe Value Of Digital Privacy In An Information Technology Age1799 Words   |  7 PagesThe Value of Digital Privacy in an Information Technology Age Introduction Individual citizens rights to digital privacy continue to be to challenged by the increasing need for national security one the one hand, and the increasing digital vigilance many companies are putting into place to protect themselves while learning more about their customers. These factors are a volatile catalyst that continues to change the ethical, legal and personal landscape rights of digital privacy in the informationRead MoreThe Great Technological Evolution And Emergence Of Social Media1573 Words   |  7 PagesIn the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States went into defensive mode, increasing surveillance and dismantling privacy rights. The Patriot Act was hastily passed just a month later in October 2001 and it severely limited the privacy of Americans and gave unprecedented power to the government and private agencies to track innocent Americans, turning regular citizens into suspects.5 In addition, the great technological evolution and emer gence of social media that occurredRead MoreProtection Vs. Privacy : The Government s Use Of Surveillance1252 Words   |  6 PagesGovernment’s Use of Surveillance Since the industrial revolution, society has continued to grow larger, and more interconnected than ever before. Aiding in this process has been the advancement of technology and ideas. With the extensive advancement of technology, an equally sizable debate on its ethical implications has developed. In recent years an ethical dilemma has arose pertaining to the use of government surveillance. While the increased surveillance of citizens by the government is beneficialRead MoreSurveillance And Information Technologies For Administration And Control Processes Essay1191 Words   |  5 PagesSurveillance is ubiquitous in societies that depend on communication and information technologies for administration and control processes (Lyon, 1). Anyone who uses new media are subject to checking, monitoring and scrutinizing; it is near impossible to find an arena free from listening, watching or tracking (Lyon, 2). Some suggest that not doing anything criminal means they ought to have no conc erns with or that they are not interesting enough as an individual to be worth surveying (Buettner, 2015)Read MoreThe United Kingdoms Investigatory Powers Act 2016 : Case Study740 Words   |  3 PagesKingdom signed to law the Investigatory Powers Act of 2016 (IPA), a comprehensive law that grants the UK government expanded access for digital surveillance. A controversial piece of legislation, the IPA is especially relevant for discussions about import/export laws governing encryption, as among other things, it compels UK companies, and possibly also exporters to the UK, to provide the government encryption keys and/or other points of access during a criminal investigation (BBC 2015). What provesRead MoreDigital Privacy Concerns Essay1565 Words   |  7 Pages Digital privacy concerns, which have been a major issue in our country since 2001, increasingly violate our basic human rights as global citizens. The growing amount of government surveillance has manifested in the enactment of acts such as SOPA and CISPA. Although their intent on stopping digital piracy and attacks were clear, both were immediately met with harsh criticism; they allowed big corporations to violate our privacy rights by sharing our personal information with both other companiesRead MorePrivacy Risks in the Digital Age1271 Words   |  6 PagesPrivacy in Digital Age The Risk of Digital Age Indeed, the Digital age has been considered as one of the greatest development of the world today. It has brought different benefits to the lives of people and catered all their needs and wants. As the world gets into crave for things that are â€Å"quick and easy†, the Digital Age had posed threat to people’s privacy and security (Meeks, 2000). The advancement in new technologies and gadgets should not only be considered as something good that came intoRead MoreSecurity Camera Technology Is Good Or Bad1341 Words   |  6 Pagestechnology through a quick synopsis of its development over the past century and in arguments both for and against the use of it. At the end will be a conclusion on whether the use of security camera technology is good or bad. Modern electronic video surveillance has its roots in film photography. A person by the name of Mr.Norbury from the English town of Nottingham made a little known invention to find out who was stealing from him. He invented a contraption using a box camera and a trip wire that wouldRead MoreOnline Technology And Its Effect On Society917 Words   |  4 Pagesactivity to prevent criticism of the government.† With this, the government is manipulating their citizens, and violating their privacy. Many people have attempted to take stands on this issue, but the government does a commendable job of keeping situations on the down low. The president of the United States, Mr. Barack Obama, promised his nation that he Will strengthen privacy protections for the digital age and will harness the power of technology to hold government and business accountable for violations

Attracting Non-Traditional Students in Post-Secondary...

Despite the similarities between traditional and non-traditional students, differences in adult students’ experience of and perceptions about education make their transition to college unique. In order to be successful in recruiting and retaining non-traditional students, universities need to provide resources and incentives to this sector of students. In American in the mid 1970’s, only 30% of all jobs required higher education (Gonzalez). Today, the reality is that 63% now require post-secondary education (Gonzalez). The immense number of job losses in the last few years due to the declining economy has had a large impact on the non-traditional student population. With this growing trend in education, universities need to compete†¦show more content†¦(Early Childhood Education Programs). Students can also opt to volunteer at the center to help defer the cost. Not only does this help the student afford care, but it would cut down the cost of this progra m by reducing the amount of paid staff that would be on site. In addition, to defer the cost of this program to the University, internships could be offered to students that are pursuing a degree in Elementary Education or Human Development and Family Studies. For children that are in elementary school UC Berkeley also offers transportation to and from the campus to your child’s school. Types of programs like these are invaluable to the non-traditional student. Programs such as these make attending classes easier on the non-traditional student that may not be available at the times the classes are offered due to their commitments off campus. For a non-traditional student, financial aid is difficult to find. Most grants are tailored toward the traditional student. A substantial amount of non-traditional students are unable to quit or cut back on their career to attend classes especially when they are taking on an additional monetary hardship. Penn State University offers a 30+ program (30+ Program). This program allocates $2000 lifetime award per student. The amount you receive per semester is determined by the amount of credits that you carry each semester. While this is a great program, in the big picture, that doesn’t even begin to put a dent inShow MoreRelatedSample Resume : National Product1025 Words   |  5 Pagesnational product.† (Darden, 2009 p. 15). Consequently, if America is going to be successful in the twenty-first century, education is essential. Currently, manual labor is machine operated. Historically, individual persons built back-roads, dug for coal, and worked on assembly l ines. Today, workers operate a machine that assembles packages with the push of one button that is designed to accomplish the task (Darden, 2009). 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Create A Quality Workforce By Growing, Training, And Attracting The Finest Talent- Higher education will be a dominant, if not decisive, factor in preparing workers with the robust skills needed to adapt to changing job requirements. Support Current Business And Industry- Current business and industry receives support through the customized services offered by higher education. As technology and the economic climate change, higher education can be a valuableRead MoreWhy Are There So Few Women Of The Math And Science Professions? Essay1532 Words   |  7 PagesWhy are there so few women in the math and science professions? Sommers’ reviews the history of women’s involvement in science. In the nineteenth century, women’s accesses to education and opportunities for employment in science had greatly improved. 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FirstRead MoreRelations Between China And The United States1794 Words   |  8 Pages ABSTRACT This paper tries to study the relations of one superpower and another emerging power in the world. This bilateral relation has passed through a roller-coaster nature since the Cold War period. But then since post cold war period the relations had warmed and it became a ‘strategic partnership’ . This paper tries to do an in-depth study of the changing relation between two countries, with historical background, major events, understanding the importance of this bilateral relation with respectRead MorePolice Training: a Modern Approach Essay5040 Words   |  21 PagesApproach This research paper will examine the idea that traditional police training methods are inefficient for modern adult learners and new methods and techniques need to be utilized to ensure that today’s police force remains highly trained, professional and effective. The theory behind my thesis statement is that police officers are starting their law enforcement careers later in life (Mineard, 2006), are more diverse, have higher education and more life experiences. In the past, police officersRead MoreThe social and economic disparities between rural and urban communities in Australia are well2900 Words   |  12 Pagesof services, are typical of rural Australia. Although it would appear that Australia is paying too little attention to all of these factors in the rural context, it is argued that, for many rural young people, their restricted access to tertiary education is a significant barrier to the development of a skilled knowledge-focused workforce in rural and remote re gions of Australia. This essay delves into this area of research and seeks to answer the following question; how does geographical locationRead MoreThe Influence of Instructional Facilities on Students’ Academic Performance in Public Secondary Schools in Sapele Local Government Area of Delta State11042 Words   |  45 Pagesframework†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦..†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦13 Instructional facilities †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦..†¦15 The importance of instructional facilities in teaching and learning†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.27 Importance of resources availability in secondary schools †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦..†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦..33 Academic performance concepts†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦46 Importance of resources to the concept of academic performances†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.....................51 Appraisal of literature†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.53 CHAPTER

Macroeconomics †institutions by Acemoglu Free Essays

string(76) " that they can hold up the citizens after they undertake their investments\." In Progress. Abstract: In this paper, we discuss how and why institutions— broadly, the economic and political organization of societies— affect economic incentives and outcomes. After briefly surveying a number of theories of institutional differences across countries, we focus on two questions: why societies may choose institutions that are not good for economic development, and why institutions, even bad Institutions, persist. We will write a custom essay sample on Macroeconomics – institutions by Acemoglu or any similar topic only for you Order Now In light of the Ideas we develop, we discuss three case studies of Institutions alluding and persistence: the united States, India and Guatemala. L. Introduction Institutions, defined broadly as the political and economic organization of societies, differ markedly across countries and over time. For example, until recently, a large number of societies were organized along socialist lines, with widespread collective ownership of the means of production and centrally planned resource allocation, while much of the rest of the world was capitalist, with predominantly private ownership and resources allocated Vela markets. For much of the 1 8th and 9th centuries, a number of societies, Including the Caribbean, much of Central and Latin America, and parts of Asia, were organized with political and economic power concentrated in the hands of a small elite, and relied on productive relationships based on slavery and forced labor. In contrast, economic and political power was more equally distributed in parts of Europe, North America and Australia, and the majority of laborers were free. Similarly, as emphasized by North and Thomas (1973), North and Whiniest (1989) and Till (1 990), there were Important differences In the organization of the European societies during the 17th century. While England and the Netherlands had developed limited governments, France and Spain had absolutist regimes. Economic theory and basic common sense suggest that differences in the organization of society should have an effect on economic outcomes: when institutions ensure that a potential investor has property rights over the proceeds from his Investments, he Is more likely to invest than when he expects the fruits of his efforts to be taken by other parties In the economy or by the government. An obvious hypothesis is then to link variations in economic performance across countries to their institutions. We refer to this point of view as the institutions hypothesis. According to one version of this hypothesis, what is crucial is whether the organization of the society ensures that a broad cross-section of the society have effective property rights, so that those with productive emphasis on â€Å"a broad cross-section of the society’ is meant to capture the notion that it is not sufficient for the rights of a small elite, landowners, dictators or Politburo members, to be enforced. Citizens need to have effective property rights, and be involved in politics, at least some degree, to ensure the continuation of these repertory rights in the future. Do we see marked differences in the economic performance of societies with different institutions? The examples mentioned in the first paragraph suggest so: while West Germany prospered with a capitalist system, East Germany did much less well under socialism. While Western Europe, North America and Australia grew rapidly, the elite-dominated societies of the Caribbean, Central America and India stagnated throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. As emphasized by North and Thomas (1973), while England and the Netherlands prospered during the 17th century, Spain and France failed to do so. Also telling are cases where large changes in institutions are correlated with radically changed growth paths. Examples of this are Argentina in the sass’s with the rise of populism and Person, South Korea during the early sass’s with the transition from the Rhea to the Park regime, and Indonesia in 1965 with the transition between Saguaro and Short. In addition to these selective examples, much empirical evidence suggests that institutional differences are a major source of the differences in economic performance across countries. For example, cross-country work by a number of economists and political scientists found a first-order effect of institutions on growth or the level of income (e. G. , Knack and Keeper, 1995, or Hall and Jones, 1999). More recently, in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000) we found that as much as % of the income gap between the top and bottom of the world income distribution may be due to differences in their institutions. 4 But these findings pose as many questions as they answer: 1 . If some institutions generate more income and growth, why do a large number of societies adopt institutions that are bad for economic development? . Why do institutions that are detrimental to economic performance persist rather than being overhauled at the first opportunity? Despite the importance of these questions for understanding differences in economic performance across countries, there is relatively little research on this topic. In this paper, we develop a number of conjectures related to th ese questions. Then, in light of these ideas, we discuss three case studies of institution building and persistence: the U. S. , India and Guatemala. In the process, we also provide a brief survey of a number of theories of comparative institutions. II. Institutions As emphasized in the introduction, our focus is on the set of institutions— the organization of society— that determine economic incentives. Why such institutions and social arrangements will affect economic outcomes is clear: economic actors will only undertake investments when they expect to be rewarded for their spending and effort. In a society where property rights are not well enforced, investment and output will be low. We therefore take the degree of enforcement of property rights to be a central feature of the institutions and the broad organization of a society. To of private property, which we take to correspond to a set of institutions ensuring that a broad cross-section of society have effective property rights. 2. Extractive institutions, which place political power in the hands of a small elite. With extractive institutions, the majority of the population does not have effective property rights, since the political power of the elite means that they can hold up the citizens after they undertake their investments. You read "Macroeconomics – institutions by Acemoglu" in category "Papers" We expect institutions of private property to encourage investment and development, while extractive institutions are less likely to dead to high investment and successful economic outcomes. Notice that there is more to institutions than the legal code or the formal definition of property rights at a point in time; in particular, political institutions matter. This is for the simple reason that in a society where there are few constraints on political elites, these agents can change the legal code or manipulate the existing property rights to their advantage. Therefore, effective constraints on political elites are an essential ingredient of institutions of private property. In reality, there are many intermediate cases teens the extremes of institutions of private property and extractive institutions, and a complex interaction between the exact form of the political and economic institutions and whether they provide effective property rights protection to citizens. There is also a d eep and difficult question of how the state commits to providing property rights to the citizens (see Whiniest, 1997, for a discussion of this problem). To limit the discussion, we do not focus on these issues. So what determines whether a society ends up with institutions of private property or extractive institutions? Let us distinguish four broad theories, which we call: 1. The efficient institutions view. 2. The incidental institutions view. 3. The rent-seeking view. 4. The inappropriate institutions view. We now discuss what we mean by these different views, and examine some selective examples of institutional theories falling within each category. . The Efficient Institutions View According to this view, societies will choose the institutions that maximize their total surplus. How this surplus will be distributed among different groups or agents does not affect the choice of institutions. The underlying reasoning of this view comes from the Cease Theorem. Ronald Cease (1960) argued that when different economic parties could negotiate costless, they will be able to bargain to internalize potential externalities. The farmer, who suffers from the pollution created by the nearby factory, can pay the factory owner to reduce pollution. The same reasoning can be applied to political situations. If the current laws or institutions benefit a certain group while creating a disproportionate cost for another, these two groups can negotiate to change the institutions. By doing so they will increase the size of the total surplus (â€Å"the pie† that they have to divide between themselves), and they can hen bargain over the distribution of this additional surplus. Many different versions of the efficient institutions view have been proposed. Demesne (1967) argued that private property emerged from common property when land become sufficiently scarce and valuable that it was efficient to privative it. Other famous examples are Case’s (1936) earlier work and the more formal analysis by Grossman and Hart (1986), is more concerned with the governance of firms or markets than the political organization of societies, but his reasoning was guided by the same principle. North ND Thomas applied this reasoning to the nature of feudal institutions arguing that they were an efficient contract between serfs and Lords. While Williamson and North and Thomas do not specify how different parties will reach agreement to achieve efficient institutions, Becker (1960) and Whitman (1989) have investigated how democracies can reach such agreements via competition among pressure groups and political parties. In their view, an inefficient institution cannot be stable because a political entrepreneur has an incentive to propose a better institution and with the extra surplus generated will be able to make him more attractive to voters. We believe that, despite correctly emphasizing certain forces that are likely to be at work, the efficient institutions view does not provide the right framework for an analysis of the differences in institutions across countries. Both historical and econometric evidence suggests that the economic costs to societies of extractive institutions have been substantial. For example, our estimates in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000) suggest that changing Insignia’s or Sierra Lens’s institutions to those of Chile loud lead, in the long run, to a more than 7-fold increase in these countries’ income. It is difficult to argue that these institutions are therefore efficient for Nigeria, Sierra Leone or many other less-developed countries in Africa or Latin America. In the rest of the paper, we therefore focus on theories of institutions where societies may end up with institutions that are not optimal for aggregate growth or income. 2. The Incidental Institutions View The efficient institutions view is explicitly based on economic reasoning: the costs and benefits of different institutions are weighed against each other to determine which institutions should prevail. Efficiency arises because individuals calculate according to the social costs and benefits. Institutions are therefore choices. A different approach, popular among many political scientists and sociologists, is to downplay choices over institutions, but think of institutions as the byproduct of other social interactions. Here, we discuss three such theories. The first is the theory developed by Barrington Moore (1966) in his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, the second is Till’s (1990) and Herb’s (2001) theory of state formation, hill the third is Burner’s (1976) theory of the emergence of capitalism in England. Barrington Moore constructed his famous theory in an attempt to explain the different paths of political development in Britain, Germany and Russia. In particular, he investigated why Britain had evolved into a democracy, while Germany succumbed to fascism and Russia had a communist revolution. Moore stressed the extent of centralization of agriculture and resulting labor relations in the countryside, the strength of the ‘bourgeoisie,’ and the nature of class coalitions. In his theory, democracy emerged when there was a strong, politically assertive, immemorial middle class, and when agriculture had commercialese so that there were no feudal labor relations in the countryside. Fascism arose when the middle classes were weak and entered into a political coalition with landowners. Finally, a agriculture was not commercialese and rural labor was repressed through feudal relationships. In Moor’s theory, therefore, class coalitions and the way agriculture is organized determine which political institutions will emerge. Although Moore is not explicitly concerned with economic development, it is a direct implication of his analysis that societies may end up with institutions that do not maximize income or growth, for example, when they take the communist revolution path. While this theory is highly suggestive and clearly captures some of the potentially significant comparative facts there are clear problems with it. For instance, though Moor’s remark â€Å"no bourgeoisie, no democracy’ is famous, it is not clear from his analysis whether this is Just an empirical correlation or a causal theory. More generally, Moore does not clarify the connection between the formation of class coalitions and political outcomes. It is also not clear whether this theory is empirically successful. There are many examples of societies with relatively strong capitalist classes in Latin America, such as Argentina and Chile, which did not make the transition to a consolidated democracy until recently. In fact, in these societies capitalist classes appear to have supported the coups against democracy, suggesting that the role of the poor segments of the society (the working class) in inducing demagnification could be more important than that of the bourgeoisie (see Archduchesses, Stephens and Stephens, 1992, Guacamole and Robinson, Bibb). In a very different vein, Till (1990), building on the Hibernia tradition, proposed a theory of the formation of modern states. He argued extensively that modern state institutions such as fiscal systems, bureaucracy and parliaments are closely related to the need to raise resources to fight wars and thus arose in places with incessant inter-state competition. Herbs (2001) has recently provided a substantive extension of this line of research by applying it to the evolution of state institutions in Africa. He argues that the poor functioning of many modern African states is due to the fact that they caked the features–high population density and inter-state warfare— necessary for the emergence of the modern state. Although interesting and sweeping, this theory does not seem to accord well with a number of major facts. In Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2001 a), we documented that among the former colonies, it was the less densely settled places that became richer. In fact, North America, Australia and New Zealand were very sparsely settled in 1 500, especially when compared to West Africa around the same time. Despite this, they developed effective states and institutions of private property. This suggests that the issues stressed by Till and Herbs are not the major determinants of institutions, at least, in the context of the development of institutions among the former European colonies, including Africa. Burner’s (1976) theory of the rise of capitalism in Europe can also be thought as an example of the incidental institutions view. Although Brenner subscribes to the Marxist view of feudalism as an extractive institution (see next subsection), he interprets the rise of capitalism as the byproduct of the collapse of existing social institutions after the Black Death. Brenner argues that the decline of feudalism resulted from the successful class struggle by the relatively powerful British peasantry. Brenner, however, believes that the peasantry’s aim was not to build capitalism; capitalism just emerged like an incidental phoenix from the ashes of feudalism. Because, economic growth required this set of (extractive) institutions to be replaced by capitalist institutions. Therefore, Burner’s work also gives us an incidental- institutions theory for why some societies grow faster. None of these theories provide a framework that is at the same time consistent tit the first-order facts of comparative development and useful for generating predictions. Therefore, it is difficult to apply these theories to understand why some countries develop extractive institutions. Moreover, being trained as economists, we find it to be a shortcoming of this group of theories that institutions and political outcomes arise as byproducts, not as the direct consequences of actions taken by rational agents. The fact that the key outcomes are byproducts of other interactions, not choices, leads to the additional problem that these theories often do not generate tight empirical predictions (I. E. Comparative static). But an analysis of comparative development, above all else, requires comparative static results regarding when institutions of private property will emerge. In the remainder of the paper, we therefore focus on the rent-seeking and inappropriate institutions views to build a simple framework for comparative development. 3. The Rent-seeking View According to this view, institutions are not always chosen by the whole society (and not for the benefit of the whole society), but by the groups that control political power at the time (perhaps as a result of conflict with other groups demanding more rights). These groups will choose the institutions that maximize their own rents, and the institutions that result may not coincide with those that maximize total surplus. For example, institutions that enforce property rights by restricting state predation will not be in the interest of a ruler who wants to appropriate assets in the future. By establishing property rights, this ruler would be reducing his own future rents, so may well prefer extractive institutions to institutions of private property. Therefore, equilibrium institutions will not be those that maximize the size of the overall pie, but the slice of the pie taken by the powerful groups. Why doesn’t a Cease theorem type reasoning apply? Although a large literature, especially in industrial organization, has emphasized how informational problems may limit the empirical applications of the Cease theorem, we believe that the main reason for the non-applicability of the Cease theorem in politics is commitment problems (see Guacamole, 2001, for a more detailed discussion of this issue). If a ruler has political power concentrated in his hands, he cannot commit not to expropriate assets or revenues in the future. Effective property rights require that he credibly relinquishes political power to some extent. But according to the Occasion bargain, he has to be compensated for what he could have received using this power. Herein lies the problem. When he relinquishes his power, then he has no guarantees that he will receive the promised payments in the future. Therefore, by their very nature, institutions that regulate political and social power create commitment problems, and prevent Occasion bargains that are necessary to reach efficient outcomes. As an application, consider the decision of a powerful rich elite to mount a coup in a populist redistributive regime, such as that of Salvador Allendale in Chile in 1973. By undertaking a coup, the rich will ensure that economically. Why wouldn’t the elite enter into a Occasion bargain with Allendale who would wish to place future restrictions on taxes so as to remove the threat of the coup? The problem, as pointed out and analyzed in Guacamole and Robinson (2001 a), is that the democracy cannot promise not to increase taxes again once the threat of the coup disappears. By its very nature, taxes are set by the politically powerful agents, determined by the institutions at that time. Promises made at the past may be worthless when they are not backed by political power. The first systematic development of this point of view is the economics literature is North (1981), who argued in the chapter on â€Å"A Neoclassical Theory of the State† that agents who controlled the state should be modeled as self-interested. He then argued that the set of property rights which they would choose for society would be those that maximized their payoff and because of transactions costs’ these would not necessarily be the set which maximized social welfare. Though his analysis does not clarify what he meant by transactions costs, problems of commitment might be one mispronunciation for this. The notion that elites may opt for extractive institutions to increase their incomes is of course also present in much of the Marxist and dependency theory literature. For example, Dobb (1948), Brenner (1976) and Hilton (1981) saw feudalism, contrary to North and Thomas (1976)g’s model, as a set of institutions designed to extract rents from the peasants at the expense of social welfare. Dependency theorists such as Wholesalers (1974-1982), Rodney (1972), Frank (1978) and Cards and Falsetto (1979) argued that the international trading system was designed to extract rents from developing countries to the benefit of developed Mounties. Perhaps, the earliest, and often ignored, contribution to this line of reasoning is in the book by Beard (1913). Anticipating many of the insights of rational choice political science literature, Beard argued that the U. S. Constitution was an institution designed to benefit those who wrote it (such as James Madison) at the expense of the rest of society. Another important example of inefficient institutions designed to extract rents from the society is the Spanish colonial system (Stein and Stein, 1970, Coauthors, 1978, Lockhart and Schwartz, 1983). Finally, the notion that leaver is an inefficient institution designed to extract rents from slaves is also widespread (for example, Williams, 1944, Geneses, 1963, Beckoned, 1972). More recent, and for our purposes more relevant, contributions in this tradition have sought to explain comparative development. For example, in the context of Africa, Bates (1981) formulated an influential and important theory based on rent-seeking by elites. Bates argued that when elites were not invested in the productive sectors of the economy, mostly agriculture in the context of Africa, and had to rely on urban interests to remain in power, they were likely to distort prices, for example by using marketing boards to transfer resources from the rural areas to the cities. The implications of this for political stability and economic growth were disastrous. Anger and Soulful (1997, 2000) have used related ideas to analyze long-term development in the Americas. They argued that the different paths of development observed in North and Latin America in the last 300 years were due to institutional differences. In North America institutions promoted development, in Latin America they did not. Why did Latin America develop a set of institutions that impeded Caribbean, the factor endowments were suitable for growing crops such as sugarcane. Such crops had large technical scale economies and could be cultivated by slaves, factors that led to large concentrations of landownership and repressive institutions designed to control labor. Therefore, despite their costs for economic development, extractive institutions were adopted by elites who benefited from the system. On the other hand, in North America, factor endowments were suitable for growing crops with limited scale economies such as wheat, and this led to an egalitarian distribution of land, income and political power. Their theory therefore emphasizes the impact of factor endowments and technology on inequality and institutions building, and ultimately economic development. In Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000, 2001 a), we developed a complementary theory, emphasizing how European colonialists set up institutions of private property in areas where they settled in large numbers, since these institutions were directly affecting their own investments and well-being. This led us to emphasize how European settlements ere often conducive to the development of institutions of private property in the colonies. In contrast, European colonists introduced or took over existing extractive institutions in other colonies. They were more likely to do so when they did not settle, for example due to an adverse disease environment, and when extractive institutions were more profitable, for example, as in Central America where the densely settled large population could be forced to work for low wages in plantations or mines. These extractive institutions did not benefit the society as a whole, but they were inefficacy for the Europeans, who held the political power and were the extractors. We believe that the rent-seeking view provides the best framework for thinking about why certain countries ended up with extractive institutions, and provides a number of useful comparative static, which will be discussed in Section Ill. 4. The Inappropriate Institutions View According to this view, institutions may be efficient when they are introduced, but they are also costly to change (see below on this). Therefore, institutions that are efficient for a set of circumstances may no longer be efficient once the environment hinges. Nevertheless, it may be difficult or too costly to change these institutions at this point. The idea here goes back to Crosschecking (1963). In the context of financial institutions, Crosschecking argued that certain arrangements, such as bank finance, might be more appropriate for backward countries trying to catch up. This is widely thought to be a good explanation for why banks are more prevalent in Germany, even today when Germany is no longer a backward country. So perhaps, social arrangements that were introduced at some point as an optimal response to the resistances may continue to prevail, even after they cease to be the optimal response. In the context of financial institutions, this point is developed in Guacamole, Action and Kilobit (2001). Another economic example is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard. David (1986) argued that this was appropriate at the time because it slowed down the speed of typing, when the rudimentary nature of typewriters meant that rapid typing would make them Jam. However, despite the fact that the QWERTY arrangement was inefficient once the basic technology improved soon after, it has similar thesis. Perhaps, extractive institutions were appropriate for certain resistances, but they continue to apply even after they cease to be the efficient institutional arrangement. Related ideas have been suggested in the literature. For example, Wittingly (1957) argued that centralized despotism, which may not have been very costly in terms of economic outcomes in China before the 1 5th century and arose as the result of providing desirable public goods such as irrigation, persisted almost to the present, creating a substantial economic and social burden. Given how long institutions persist (see Section ‘V) the view that institutions of a different age ay continue to apply even when they become costly to economic success is highly plausible. Nevertheless, in the context of comparative development, it appears more useful to combine the inappropriate institutions view with the rent-seeking view, explicitly allowing for political elites to introduce inefficient institutions. In fact, in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2001 a), we suggested a hypothesis combining the rent-seeking and inappropriate institutions views, and provided evidence in favor of this hypothesis. We argued and empirically demonstrated that extractive institutions, tit power concentrated in the hand of a small elite, were much less costly during the age of agriculture than during the age of industry. When agriculture is the main source of income, and the political elite owns the land, this elite will have, to a first approximation, adequate incentives to increase the productivity of the land. In contrast, in the age of industry, many different agents, not previously part of the ruling elite, need to undertake investments and be involved in productive activities. Without effective property rights, these agents are unlikely to invest, so extractive institutions become much more costly once industrialization opportunities arrive on the scene. This explains why the sugar colonies of Barbados, Haiti and Jamaica were amongst the richest places in the world in 1700 but rapidly fell behind when industrial technologies became available. Overall, we therefore conclude that to understand the significant differences in how countries are organized, we need to move away from the pure efficiency view. Moreover, existing series of institutional differences based on the incidental institutions view cannot provide a satisfactory tarring point, and make less sharp empirical predictions, since institutions are simply byproducts of other social actions. Instead, we believe that conflict over the distribution of rents matters, and the rent seeking view provides the best starting place for an analysis of institutional differences across countries. In addition, there may be an important element of the inappropriate institutions view, so that institutions that were introduced at a certain point in time may become less appropriate and more â€Å"harmful† in the future, but may still remain in place. Ill. Institutional Origins The rent-seeking and inappropriate institutions views do not immediately generate a theory of comparative institutions. They simply point out that inefficient institutions may be chosen by political elites, and the institutions in place may become more costly for growth over time. As discussed above, by the institutions hypothesis, we mean that differences in the development experiences of countries can be explained by differences in their institutions. To make this hypothesis operational, we need to choose institutions of private property. In other words, we need to develop comparative static on institution building. This is not an easy task. In fact, some of the pioneering theories of institutions, such as North (1981), give us few clues about when we should expect extractive institutions to prevail. Here, we highlight a few potential determinants of what type of institutions politically powerful groups will choose: 1. Economic Interests: A first determinant of whether institutions of private property will emerge is whether they will lead to outcomes that are in interests of the politically powerful agents. For example, institutions that restrict state predation will not be in the interest of a ruler ho wants to appropriate assets in the future. Yet this strategy may be in the interest of a ruler who recognizes that only such guarantees will encourage citizens to undertake substantial investments or lend him money, or will protect his own rents. They will also be in the interest of the major groups that can undertake investment in production activities in the future. Anger and Solidify explanation for why extractive institutions emerged in the Caribbean but not in North America falls within this category. In the Caribbean, the factor endowments made extractive institutions more profitable for the elite. In particular, sugar production, which could exploit economies of scale and profitably employ slave labor, was conducive to a society where a small elite would control both political and economic power. Our argument in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000) for why European settlement in the colonies led to institutions of private property is also based on the same reasoning. When a large number of Europeans settled in an area, they preferred institutions enforcing property rights, since these property rights would enable them to undertake investments. Our argument in Guacamole Johnson and Robinson (2001 a) is also related. There, we suggested that high population density and relative prosperity (I. E. , GAP per capita) of the colonized territory encouraged European colonialists to set up extractive institutions. The reasoning is that high population density implied a large labor force that Europeans could force to work for low wages, and both high population density and the relative prosperity of the population provided Europeans with a greater resource base for extraction or taxation. Economic interests† therefore suggest that we should expect extractive institutions to develop when the powerful agents have little to gain from enforcing property sights because they have few investment opportunities themselves and are not linked to other productive agents in the society, and when there are resources, such as crops or abundant labor, that can be effectively exploited by extractive 2. Political Losers: Another important factor is whether institutional development will destabilize the system, making it less likely that elites will remain in power after reforms. An institutional setup encouraging investment and adoption of new technologies may be blocked by elites when they fear that this process of growth and social change will How to cite Macroeconomics – institutions by Acemoglu, Papers

Business Capstone Project Organic Food Market

Question: Describe about the Business Capstone Project of Organic Food Market . Answer: What factors influence the purchase of organic foods ways Rosebery residents in Sydney NSW? Introduction: The organic food market in Sydney is small niche markets. The organic products that are part of the domestic market are only 0.2 percent of total sales of food (Paul and Rana 2012). This percentage is related to less than 2 percent of all the agricultural land that is farmed organically in Sydney (Wikstrm et al. 2014). However, the sales from the organic food in the market of Sydney are only about 120 million dollars and this comes from exports from the global markets in organic food (Denver and Jensen 2014). Organic Production is a system that helps in the contribution of healthy people and soil (Henryks et al. 2015). It does not use chemicals; in fact, it promotes improved biological activity and encourages sustainability (Williams et al. 2015). Despite the fact that organic production is associated with acceptable characteristics very little research and development is carried out or accepted by the organic industry. The reason behind this is that there is restricted government funding for the research available in the organic industry and lack of communication for the support and growth of organic farming (Gracia and Magistris 2013). Opportunities: The small size of the market in Sydney makes it vulnerable to seasonal cycles and business. Since the number of producers is less, the industry is not able to maintain the supply of organic products and the quality is not maintained at the same time (Paul and Rana 2012.). Thus, there is a requirement that the organic market maintains stability so that the consumers are able to fulfil their needs related to organic products. In the coming years, the organic market shall increase as the number of consumers for the organic products shall increase (Liu et al. 2013). There is a likelihood that the, organic industry shall expand and increase in the coming years and that there was an increased awareness of organic food all over the world and not just Sydney NSW. Problems: In Sydney, the consumers have become frustrated due to lack of coordination from changes in the supply of products, co ordination from the producers and price disadvantages and they do not appreciate the benefits of foods that are produced organically (Solomon 2014). Thus, it was noted during the research that consumers in Sydney have poor understanding of the organic food that is available. Additionally, at the time of conducting the research it was seen that the consumers in Sydney do not have sufficient knowledge about the consumer behaviour that shall induce them in buying organic food (Gracia and Magistris 2013). Research Questions: How do consumers in Sydney identify and assess organic products? What the factors that influence the purchase decision of consumers in Sydney to buy products that are organic in nature? What is the purchase decision structure adopted by the consumers in Sydney when buying the organic products in Australia? Research Methodologies: This part of chapter 1 shall include the method of research that was used during the research. This section includes the qualitative and quantitative research method and it justifies the choice of method that was used to investigate on the given topic. The decision to adopt a quantitative or qualitative research method depends much on the contribution of solving the problem in the research. In the section of problems, the research problems were outlined and the research questions were formed based on the research problems. Following the step of formation of research question was the issue of adopting the accurate method of research, that is qualitative or quantitative research methods. It was therefore; decided that for this research a qualitative approach should be adopted so that a proper type of investigation is completed. The qualitative method enables the subjective standpoint to be captured successfully. The qualitative research method focuses on understanding and interpretation of the relevant theories and themes in practice whereas quantitative research focuses more on the statistical analysis of the problem depending on the hypothesis that is set by the researcher at the beginning of the research (Solomon 2014). In qualitative research methodology the theory can be casual or non casual and is often inductive. This is however relevant to the research that is been undertaken as it involves interpretation and understanding of the data that shall be available after conducting a primary and secondary research. Gantt chart Main activities Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 5 Week 6 7 Week 8 Selection of dissertation topic v Composition of literature review v Research methodology v Collection of primary data v Collection of secondary data v Results and findings v Analysis and interpretation of data v Conclusion and recommendation v Final submission v Table 1: Gantt chart (Source: Created by Author) Research Process: There are two types of variable based on which the research process is conducted, those are: Dependent Variable Independent Variable Dependent variable is the one that is of the interest to the researcher, whereas, independent variable is the one that affects the dependent variable. The researcher has the authority of manipulating the independent variable and observes the changes created in the dependent variable. A research should be conducted on both the dependent variable as well the independent variable. For this research, the availability of the organic food product shall be considered as independent variable whereas the dependent variable shall be the behaviour of the consumers (Liu et al. 2013). Data Collection and Analysis: For this research, the researcher shall rely on both primary as well as secondary data. The secondary data includes articles, journals and books whereas the primary data includes answers, responses of surveys conducted on a selected organisation or a group of people. For this research, a primary research shall be conducted on the people who stay at Rosebery residents in Sydney NSW for the factors that affect their purchase of organic food. The researcher shall collect responses from 50 respondents who are staying at the Rosebery Residents. As already mentioned, that for this research the researcher will conduct a qualitative research. Based on the responses that the researcher will obtain from the primary research a qualitative analysis will be conducted. Expected Outcome: The research will be able to draw the conclusion regarding the factors that influence the purchase of organic foods ways Rosebery residents in Sydney NSW. The research will produce an effective analysis on the factors that affect the purchase power of consumers in Rosebery residents. The research shall produce an effective discussion on the consumer behaviour theory, internal factor influencing the consumer, the motivation of the consumers that are conscious by nature and the cultural factors influencing the consumer. Moreover, the research shall also produce effective outcome of the social factor that influence the consumer, personal factors of the people and psychological factors affecting consumer behaviour (Denver and Jensen 2014). References: Denver, S. and Jensen, J.D., 2014. Consumer preferences for organically and locally produced apples.Food Quality and Preference,31, pp.129-134. Gracia, A. and de Magistris, T., 2013. Organic food product purchase behaviour: a pilot study for urban consumers in the South of Italy.Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research,5(4), pp.439-451. Henryks, J., Pearson, D., Anisimova, T. and Sultan, P., 2015. Are organic food labels inadequate? Evidence from consumers in Australia.Business and Management Studies,1(2), pp.45-54. Liu, R., Pieniak, Z. and Verbeke, W., 2013. Consumers' attitudes and behaviour towards safe food in China: A review.Food Control,33(1), pp.93-104. Paul, J. and Rana, J., 2012. Consumer behavior and purchase intention for organic food.Journal of consumer Marketing,29(6), pp.412-422. Paul, J. and Rana, J., 2012. Consumer behavior and purchase intention for organic food.Journal of consumer Marketing,29(6), pp.412-422. Solomon, M.R., 2014.Consumer behavior: Buying, having, and being. Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: prentice Hall. Wikstrm, F., Williams, H., Verghese, K. and Clune, S., 2013. The influence of packaging attributes on consumer behaviour in food-packaging LCA studies ea neglected topic.Journal of Cleaner Production,30, p.1e9. Wikstrm, F., Williams, H., Verghese, K. and Clune, S., 2014. The influence of packaging attributes on consumer behaviour in food-packaging life cycle assessment studies-a neglected topic.Journal of Cleaner Production,73, pp.100-108. Williams, L.T., Germov, J., Fuller, S. and Freij, M., 2015. A taste of ethical consumption at a slow food festival.Appetite,91, pp.321-328.